Brazil's vote tests an institutional partnership Pretoria relies on

Brazilian voters return to the polls on 25 October to decide whether President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva keeps his office or hands power to Flávio Bolsonaro, son of the imprisoned former president Jair Bolsonaro. For institutions and policymakers watching from Pretoria, this is not merely a foreign election. It is a referendum on whether one of South Africa’s most important institutional partnerships survives, and on who will sit across the table when questions of global governance, accountability and multilateral reform are next debated.

The stakes were made explicit only two months ago, when the two governments met in Pretoria for the eighth session of the Brazil-South Africa Joint Commission. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening bilateral cooperation and advancing a common agenda for the Global South. International Relations Minister Ronald Lamola used the occasion to stress the partnership’s importance at a political moment when multilateralism itself faces critical challenges. That meeting now reads differently in light of the polls, which show a statistical tie between the two candidates. The officials who signed off on that common agenda may soon find their counterparts replaced by a government with very different institutional instincts.

The core of the partnership lies in how both countries have used their positions as regional powers to press for a fairer international order. Brazil and South Africa have long demanded reform of global institutions that remain dominated by Western powers, the UN Security Council chief among them. Their cooperation through BRICS, the G20 and other multilateral platforms has been instrumental in promoting greater independence for developing countries, even if those commitments have not always translated into consistent foreign policy positions.

A change of administration in Brasília could undo much of this institutional work. Under Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil turned away from its traditional commitment to South-South cooperation and cultivated close ideological ties with Donald Trump and the United States instead. Flávio Bolsonaro has embraced much of his father’s political agenda, and his victory would likely pull Brazil closer to Washington, weakening its role as an independent voice in global affairs. That shift matters at a time when the Trump administration has shown willingness to use economic, diplomatic and, at times, military means to force other countries into line. Both Brazil and South Africa have been targets of such pressure, which is precisely why their cooperation carries institutional weight.

If Brazil realigns with Washington, South Africa could find itself increasingly isolated and more exposed to American pressure. The consequences would reach across Africa as well. Lula has prioritised stronger relations with African countries, recognising Brazil’s historical and cultural connections to the continent and promoting cooperation across the South Atlantic. Under Jair Bolsonaro, Africa largely vanished from Brazil’s foreign policy priorities. A return to that approach would weaken, if not implode, an important bridge between Africa and Latin America.

Accountability questions sharpen the contrast further. Under Lula, Brazil has been an outspoken critic of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, and in September 2025 it formally joined South Africa’s genocide case against Israel before the International Court of Justice. The Bolsonaro family, by contrast, maintains close ties to conservative evangelical Christian movements that treat support for Israel as both a religious duty and a political priority. During Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency, Brazil became one of Israel’s closest allies in Latin America. Flávio has promised to move Brazil’s embassy to Jerusalem, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has openly backed his candidacy, personally congratulating him on his first-round performance. For South Africa and its case before the court, losing such an ally would carry real consequences for the pursuit of justice and accountability.

There is also a broader governance question inside BRICS itself. The bloc’s expansion has brought in countries with diverging political systems and troubling records on democratic freedoms, women’s rights and the rights of LGBTI people. This raises a difficult question: can BRICS credibly claim to champion a fairer world while remaining largely silent about repression within its own membership? Brazil and South Africa have been among the countries best positioned to push a more progressive vision of South-driven transformation. A Bolsonaro victory would make that considerably harder, leaving South Africa further isolated in defending a global project rooted in human rights and democratic accountability. The risk is that BRICS becomes little more than a club of resource-rich countries united by commercial interests and opposition to the West, an outcome that would serve ruling classes and economic elites in the North and South alike, and one that Trump and Netanyahu would welcome.

Both countries emerged from deeply unequal and authoritarian systems with constitutions that promised more than political rights, committing instead to equality, dignity and human rights. Whether that shared vision can hold internationally may depend, in part, on what Brazilian voters decide on 25 October. South Africans have good reason to pay attention.