PSIRA’s Oversight Failure Lets Criminal Figures Exploit South Africa’s Private Security Sector
More than 7,000 private security firms have registered in South Africa since 2020, and the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority faces mounting scrutiny over whether it has the capacity, or the will, to keep criminal actors out of the sector. Evidence suggests the industry’s rapid expansion has been exploited to access legal firearms, launder illicit operations behind legitimate business structures, and cultivate corrupt relationships with law enforcement.
The case of Vusimuzi “Cat” Matlala makes the governance gap concrete. Matlala, a tender tycoon and criminal suspect, owns CAT VIP Protection (also registered as CAT Protection and Security (Pty) Ltd), a firm PSIRA registered in 2017. Though convicted only once, in 2001, Matlala has been arrested and prosecuted more than a dozen times on serious charges including aggravated robbery. He currently faces trial for procurement fraud and three counts of attempted murder. Since his arrest in May 2025, he has been denied bail and remains in custody.
Before those legal troubles, Matlala cultivated an allegedly corrupt relationship with suspended Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Police Department deputy chief Julius Mkhwanazi, an arrangement that allowed him to fit police blue lights to his security company’s vehicles. That relationship came before both the Madlanga Commission and the Parliamentary Ad Hoc Committee inquiring into political interference, crime, and corruption in the police and criminal justice system. In October 2025, more than two years after the irregular EMPD arrangement first became public, PSIRA announced a legal review of his company’s registration. The outcome has not been announced.
Communications evidence presented to the Madlanga Commission suggests Matlala was involved in cocaine dealing. His business partner, Mike van Wyk, also owns a private security company, Anubis Protection Services. Commission evidence further indicates that a remarkable number of senior police officers and political figures received money or gifts from Matlala and became indebted to him. Last week, President Cyril Ramaphosa announced that the Madlanga Commission had recommended criminal and disciplinary steps against suspended SAPS deputy national commissioner Shadrack Sibiya, the most senior official implicated.
The regulatory concern extends well beyond a single case. Criminal operators sometimes establish private security companies to exploit the industry’s structural opportunities: corrupt security procurement, protection rackets, intimidation of rival business owners (particularly in the taxi industry), and positioning as partners of corrupt police to exploit law enforcement access. Journalist Caryn Dolley’s 2019 book on organised crime-run bouncer services in Cape Town documented that sources consistently reported private security businesses were sometimes established to access firearms “for nefarious means under a legitimate guise.”
The firearms dimension is where the governance failure becomes most acute. The Political Killings Task Team has linked private security firearms to crimes it investigated. Such weapons are also alleged to serve as instruments of intimidation and violence in the taxi industry. Security company firearms reportedly supplied some weapons used in vigilante killings and other violence during the July 2021 unrest. Firearms linked to crimes for which Matlala has been charged have also been connected to various murders reportedly authorised by another alleged criminal figure, KT Molefe.
Data from then police minister Senzo Mchunu in 2024 placed the scale of the problem in stark relief: 138 firearms were reported lost by or stolen from security companies every month, compared to roughly 55 firearms lost or stolen from the SAPS over the same period. During December 2024 raids at Matlala’s home and CAT VIP Protection premises, the SAPS seized numerous firearms, including two R5 rifles.
A particular concern involves security companies, some owned by taxi bosses, holding automatic firearms. The sector’s rapid expansion may itself be partly driven by criminal actors seeking to exploit the opportunities the industry offers.
By contrast, the regulatory response has been slow and fragmented. Addressing these governance gaps requires action across multiple institutions. The Central Firearms Registry must complete its digitisation and strengthen its operational effectiveness. PSIRA requires improved integrity and capacity to identify and expose criminal involvement in registered companies more efficiently. Broader criminal justice system improvements are essential to support both functions.
Whether PSIRA’s belated legal review of CAT VIP Protection will produce a concrete outcome, and what standard it sets for future cases, remains the open question regulators have yet to answer.