Oil and gas still dominate global energy, accounting for roughly 86 percent of worldwide supply in 2025, with no credible sign of rapid displacement by renewables at scale. The 2026 Statistical Review of World Energy, compiled by Kearney and others, confirms that total energy supply grew globally last year, fossil fuels included. Beneath that headline figure lies a structural vulnerability that shapes policy decisions across three continents: major economies remain deeply dependent on imported energy. India sources around 86 percent of its oil from abroad. China and Europe rely heavily on imported crude, and both India and Europe depend on imported gas for roughly half their supply needs, with China drawing on imports for over a third.
Regulatory and strategic decisions by governments have done little to reduce that exposure. Geopolitical instability has made the problem sharper. Volatility in the Middle East, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and sanctions against Russia have disrupted global oil and gas supply chains, forcing energy ministries and procurement agencies to reassess their sourcing arrangements. The United States, by contrast, has moved decisively in the opposite direction. American LNG exports grew 27 percent in 2025, consolidating Washington’s position as a net energy exporter and reshaping the leverage available to importing nations.
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That shift has opened a policy window. Several energy experts argue that African governments are positioned to step into the gap. Prashaen Reddy, partner and energy expert at consultancy Kearney Africa, frames the structural case plainly: oil and gas production concentrates in the Middle East, the United States, and parts of Asia, while demand sits elsewhere. The product must travel long distances across vulnerable supply routes, making energy security a governing priority for importing nations and creating durable demand for new, geographically diverse sources.
Africa’s production numbers have begun to reflect that opportunity. The continent’s energy consumption grew 3.5 percent in 2025 across a population of nearly 1.5 billion, while oil production rose 4.2 percent, driven by Nigeria, Algeria, and Libya. West African refined product exports have surged 75 percent since 2023, anchored by Nigeria’s Dangote refinery, which operates at 650,000 barrels per day and is reportedly considering a further major facility in Kenya. Dangote has demonstrated, Reddy notes, that large-scale refining can be built and operated successfully on the continent, proving the model works for regulators and investors alike.
Yet Africa’s refining capacity remains well short of what its reserves could support. The continent holds enormous oil and gas resources but lacks sufficient processing infrastructure to convert them into finished products at scale. That gap is both a constraint on current export potential and an argument for targeted investment policy.
South Africa illustrates the tension. The country imports most of the oil and gas it consumes, and its refining capacity has contracted to 300,000 barrels per day, down from levels that once allowed it to supply neighbouring states with refined products. Reddy argues that South Africa should pursue structured partnerships with resource-rich neighbours rather than attempt development in isolation. The existing Republic of Mozambique Pipeline Investments Company agreement, which delivers gas from Mozambique to Sasol in South Africa, offers a tested governance model. The African Continental Free Trade Area provides a further institutional platform for expanding intra-African trade in oil and gas, if member governments choose to use it.
Independent economist Elize Kruger agrees that current geopolitical conditions favour African development of domestic resources, which would reduce exposure to price volatility and exchange rate risks tied to import dependency. Namibia and Botswana hold strong potential as gas suppliers, and Mozambique’s LNG output is expected to grow significantly. Kruger’s caution is pointed: South Africa cannot assume preferential access. Mozambique has already entered agreements with other parties, and the window for securing favourable terms requires proactive policy decisions, not passive expectation.
The Orange Basin, where Namibia is developing oil and gas reserves, represents what Jaco Human, CEO of the Industrial Gas Users Association of Southern Africa, calls a “world standard” opportunity. Gas from the basin could provide critical support to Sasol’s Secunda plant. The timeline comparison is uncomfortable for South African policymakers. Namibia expects its first oil production in 2030. South Africa sits approximately 15 years behind in comparable development progress.
Human argues that domestic resource development must become a policy priority, with investment frameworks designed to move projects forward rather than stall them. His sharpest concern is legal: he warns that environmental litigation poses substantial risks to major energy projects, and that South African courts lack the specialized technical expertise required to adjudicate complex energy cases fairly. Specialized tribunals, in his view, would be better suited to hear such matters.
The question facing African governments is whether institutional frameworks, investment conditions, and regional agreements can be aligned quickly enough to convert a favorable geopolitical moment into durable production capacity. The supply gap is real. Whether the policy response matches it remains to be seen.